Coaches and Coordinators: Tracking NFL Decision Makers

The following is a full accounting of current NFL head coaches, offensive coordinators, and defensive coordinators. The list is meant to be a one-stop quick reference for some historical facts about the coaches in question, as well as some editorializing about how they might affect their teams' approaches in the upcoming season.

Kliff Kingsbury, HC/OC, ARI

Kingsbury was an almost notorious coaching hire by Arizona last year, shortly after he was fired from Texas Tech and even more recently after he accepted the offensive coordinator position at USC, but the coach arguably acquitted himself well in his rookie season. Even with meager offensive talent and skill sets largely ill-suited for his peculiar scheme, Kingsbury led Arizona to a 5-10-1 record, including 9-5-2 against the spread. Kingsbury will be judged by his ability to develop Kyler Murray and build the Arizona offense, however, and some of the credit for Arizona's 2019 season has to go to defensive coordinator Vance Joseph, who took a weak collection of talent and managed to somewhat offset a brutally bad pass defense with a solid run defense and effective pass rush. By contrast the offense was inconsistent in most respects and, understandable as that might be, Kingsbury will need to move the offense forward after the Cardinals averaged just 22.6 points per game. That figure was almost precisely league average for 2019 (22.8 PPG), though it took some QB injuries in Detroit, Carolina, and Pittsburgh for Arizona to place even that well. Still, Murray's rookie season was an overall success and Kingsbury gets some of the credit for that, especially given the poor OL/WR/TE personnel. If the Cardinals can improve the effectiveness of the offense in Year 2, Kingsbury's Air Raid vision may yet come to full fruition. Arizona ran a max-tempo offense with far more wide receiver snaps than any other team, oscillating between a four-wide and three-wide base offense at various points in the year. But the poor personnel resulted in a lot of three and outs, leaving Arizona with a play count ranking 22nd despite a league-leading tempo. If some of those three and outs turn to first downs in 2020, you could see the Cardinals lead the league in plays logged from scrimmage, perhaps even by an unprecedented margin, substantially raising the fantasy upside of everyone involved. Of course, if the offensive line and wide receiver play hold the offense back again, we might just get more of the same frustrating inconsistency.

Vance Joseph, DC, ARI

A well-tenured defensive leader and former Denver head coach with a background specifically coaching defensive backs, Joseph will likely receive criticism for Arizona's horrific pass defense in 2019, but whether that criticism is fair is up to some debate. We knew the Cardinals pass defense would suffer in 2019, because Patrick Peterson was suspended for the first six games and safety Budda Baker was the only established standout talent in the secondary otherwise. What we didn't have reason to expect was Arizona posting 40 sacks despite its trash secondary, nor did we have reason to expect the Cardinals 3-4 to rank 12th-best by Football Outsiders' run defense metric. Still, Joseph's debut in Arizona was probably only good enough to buy him one year of leash. Expectations will be higher regardless of how the Cardinals front office addresses its defensive personnel in the offseason, because Joseph will be reasonably expected to further develop second-year corner Byron Murphy and the fourth-year safety Baker.

Dan Quinn, HC, ATL

Another year, another bad Atlanta defense overseen by Quinn. Quinn was hired to emulate the defenses he coordinated in Seattle, yet his product in Atlanta has been inconsistent at best. As much as injuries to Keanu Neal and Desmond Trufant made things more difficult for the Falcons defense, it's still tough to rationalize how the Falcons once again finished as a below average defense, allowing 24.9 points per game when the league average was 22.8. In addition to allowing more points than the average defense, the Falcons also failed to produce playmaking stats at the league average. Their interception percentage of 2.2 was below the 2.3 league average, and their QB pressure percentage of 18.8 tied for third-worst league-wide. Quinn delegates the offense to offensive coordinator Dirk Koetter, so if Quinn can't make the defense useful then it's difficult to see what utility he provides the team.

Dirk Koetter, OC, ATL

Once one of the league's most accomplished passing game architects, Koetter at this point might be a case of a coach whose career lasted a few years too many. Even with sky-high expectations and a nearly entirely indoor season for the Falcons offense, Matt Ryan and his receivers failed to meaningfully threaten defenses most of the year, moving the chains well at times but almost never capitalizing on red-zone opportunities. Ryan spent too many of his targets checking down to Austin Hooper, Mohamed Sanu, and Russell Gage, leaving outside receivers Julio Jones and Calvin Ridley to go cold for too long at a time. Ryan's 7.3 YPA was his lowest since 2013 (6.9), and his interception rate of 2.3 percent was nearly twice his figure from 2018 (1.2 percent). Some might blame the Atlanta offensive line for this dysfunction – Ryan's sack rate of 7.2 percent was the highest of his career, 2.1 points above his career average (5.1 percent) – but a lot of those sacks might have been of the coverage variety. Football Outsiders gave the Falcons offensive line an adjusted sack rate of 6.6 percent, which was actually slightly better than the league average (7.0 percent), so either Ryan has fallen off or Atlanta's wide receivers failed to get open like they did before Koetter's arrival. Something stinks, but it's tough to tell for sure just where it's coming from. Perhaps luckily for Koetter, Ryan has bounced back from rough seasons before.

Raheem Morris, DC, ATL

Morris served as Atlanta's assistant head coach from 2015 through last year, switching between wide receivers and defensive backs for his more specific focus. He was curiously promoted to defensive coordinator two days before Atlanta's Week 17 contest, though, and he'll head into 2020 with that new title. Morris debuted in the NFL as a student under Jon Gruden and especially then-Tampa Bay defensive coordinator Monte Kiffin, who had a great deal of success as a Cover-2 coordinator. Quinn was raised in the Pete Carroll school of Cover-3 defenses, though, so Morris will presumably be charged with the task of executing Quinn's vision.

John Harbaugh, HC, BAL

Formerly a special teams coach and now a long-tenured head coach for one of the league's most stable franchises, Harbaugh can at once thank Lamar Jackson for Baltimore's return to dominance, yet can also claim substantial credit for committing to Jackson and pragmatically building the sort of offense that best suits Jackson's rare talents. Offensive coordinator Greg Roman got the green light to go unorthodox with the 2019 Baltimore offense, yet even in its first season it was often unstoppable. With eight playoff berths in his 12 seasons as head coach, including just one losing season, Harbaugh and his Ravens are big-time contenders for the foreseeable future.

Greg Roman, OC, BAL

The 2019 season was Roman's first as Baltimore's offensive coordinator, but he's been in house since 2017, mostly coaching tight ends while otherwise securing the Assistant Head Coach title beginning in 2018. There's no evidence that Roman can't run a more traditional dropback offense, but his familiarity and success with specifically Colin Kaepernick, Tyrod Taylor, and Lamar Jackson means Roman is the NFL's de facto top expert on utilizing rushing threats at quarterback. What's especially promising about Roman is that, for as much as those players fall under the umbrella of 'mobile quarterbacks,' they're not especially similar. The three have totally different natures as both runners and passers, and in each case Roman was pragmatic enough to design the offense around those traits rather than force each of the three into the same scheme. If the initial returns are any indication, Roman definitely made the right read on how to best empower Jackson, whose age-22 MVP season featured all sorts of improbable successes. With up to three reads on any particular play – the dive, the outside run, and the pass – Jackson's combination of profound speed and plus downfield passing ability make it nearly impossible to defend on a consistent basis. It generally takes a lucky guess by the defense or a misread on Jackson's part for the defense to have a chance, because otherwise it's a numbers game that just isn't in the defense's favor. It's like trying to play defense against a 12-man offense. Defenses will adjust some way or another, but the early success of Jackson and Roman implies they'll have the talent capital to make sufficient counteradjustments.

Don Martindale, DC, BAL

Like the Steelers, the Ravens have a defensive tradition that quite literally extends through the entirety of their existence, a 3-4 approach that mostly stays the same both in terms of scheme type and quality of results. The fluctuations probably occur mostly due to personnel shifts, and last year's Baltimore defense was defined by its elite secondary on the one hand but the weak linebacker play on the other. Generally speaking, when a weakness appears in the Baltimore defense it doesn't remain for long. They need to add some linebacker talent, but if they do the Ravens should put forth a steadier run defense in 2020. In the meantime it seems like we can expect Baltimore to take full advantage of its cornerback strength by sending more resources toward the pass rush, as Pro Football Reference credited the Ravens with a blitz rate of 54.9 percent, a ridiculous 11.5 points higher than the second team. Martindale will have to attempt to improve the actual pressure, though, as they finished only 15th in PFR's pressure rate category.

Sean McDermott, HC, BUF

McDermott still has something to prove as a game manager and he doesn't have the skill set to manage an NFL offense, but he's one of the NFL's top defensive minds and has mostly been successful through three years as Buffalo's head coach. Their 10-6 finish in 2019 secured the second playoff berth in McDermott's three seasons, and they nearly managed the road upset over a Texans squad that was bailed out by wacky flukes. As a defensive architect McDermott learned from perhaps the best defensive coordinator in NFL history while serving under Jim Johnson in Philadelphia from 2001 to 2008. The lessons seem to have stuck, because the Buffalo defense has been a fine product since McDermott's arrival, even with less than great personnel. That personnel variable is turning for the better in the last two years, though, especially as the Bills added Tremaine Edmunds at linebacker and Ed Oliver at defensive tackle. The secondary is already well stocked, especially since McDermott is great at coaching defensive backs in particular. The Johnson/McDermott defense contains a brilliant Moneyball approach in the secondary, where versatile zone-friendly players are accumulated and then isolated into low-difficulty, high-opportunity tasks. They have the standout Tre'Davious White to serve as a man-coverage shadow when necessary, but McDermott otherwise puts his defensive backs in playmaking position by asking them to cover grass instead of route runners, allowing them to keep their eyes on the quarterback while executing variable zone coverages that are difficult to decode prior to the snap. The same pre-snap look can result in very different blitzes and zone assignments, and when combined with a functional pass rush this applies a lot of stress to quarterbacks.

Brian Daboll, OC, BUF

He missed out on the most recent round of head coaching hires, but Daboll will probably get his shot soon if he keeps up his act from the last two years. Very few offensive coaches in the NFL have shown the vision and insight that Daboll has in Buffalo, where he's done a great job of shielding Josh Allen's considerable limitations as a passer while amplifying his similarly significant strengths. Basically, Daboll looked at Allen and correctly reasoned that his trebuchet throwing arm would be best utilized downfield as a passer, while Allen's athleticism and big frame made his rushing ability a more consistent underneath threat than his scattershot accuracy. With the rushing threat underneath and the deep kill shot equally viable in most looks, the Daboll-Allen offense does a good job of stressing the defense at opposite poles, forcing it to spread thin and make itself that much more vulnerable to the big play.

Leslie Frazier, DC, BUF

Frazier is an experienced secondary coach and defensive coordinator, but in Buffalo he functions as a trusted caretaker of a defense that mostly defers to McDermott.

Matt Rhule, HC, CAR

The biggest new name among NFL head coaches, Rhule was a coveted hire out of the NCAA ranks after he rebuilt the otherwise blighted programs of Temple (2013-2016) and Baylor (2017-2019). Unlike some recent NCAA head coaching hires like Chip Kelly and Kliff Kingsbury, Rhule has no particular ideology in terms of scheme. His approaches varied, especially at Temple, depending on the personnel he had available. Perhaps it's a coincidence that Rhule drew on varying approaches after a coaching career that saw him coach multiple positions on both sides of the ball, including quarterbacks, offensive line, tight ends, defensive line, linebackers, and special teams. Rhule has the benefit of myriad coaching perspectives, and so far his results indicate a broader ability to put all the details in the right order and solve whatever problem it is on the horizon. Although Rhule generally coached offense more than defense to this point in his career, the hire of offensive coordinator Joe Brady, another coveted college coach, indicates that Rhule is prepared to delegate a substantial amount of responsibility when it comes to conducting the offense. That's not necessarily to imply that Rhule will spend a greater percentage of his time on the defense, but it is worth noting that Rhule built uniquely strong defenses at both Temple and Baylor.

Joe Brady, OC, CAR

Not even 31 years old until September, Brady is highly inexperienced, especially for the task that awaits him. He was the 'passing game coordinator' and wide receivers coach for just one year at LSU, but that 2019 Tigers offense might be the greatest ever seen at the college level, and with LSU's incredible success so ascended Brady's stock as a coaching prospect. It's a somewhat strange hire on Carolina's part, because Rhule is not going anywhere as head coach, yet if Brady enjoys success he will get head coaching offers almost immediately. That's the reward Carolina will receive if their gamble pays off, yet there might be cause for concern in the fact that Brady has yet to coordinate a full offense. To be 31 years old and call your first offense at the NFL level is to walk into a tremendous amount of pressure and responsibility. Perhaps Brady is up for it, but again, if he is then he won't be in Carolina for long. For now, though, the more pressing question is what sort of offense Brady might run in 2020, and to what level of success. The LSU offense was defined by relentlessly explosive downfield passing, but Rhule never ran such a scheme, and Brady will presumably still report to Rhule. It's one thing for Brady to call the LSU offense like he did, on a team with probably the best collection of quarterback and pass catcher talent, but the Panthers won't have anywhere near that personnel advantage, so the calculus for Brady should change in light of that. If it's a rookie quarterback in Carolina instead of Cam Newton, I personally have trouble imagining Carolina getting too wild on offense. But whatever the approach Rhule and Brady settle on, there's reason to think they will have a sound justification for doing so. The question might not be what they mean to do, but rather what they think they can do upon seeing the Panthers personnel up close this offseason.

Phil Snow, DC, CAR

Snow arrives with Rhule from Baylor, where he also served as defensive coordinator. Snow has been coaching defense in some form or another since 1976, including five different major west coast colleges from the 1980s up to 2005, at which point Snow joined Steve Mariucci's Detroit Lions as a defensive assistant, retained by the subsequent Rod Marinelli regime as linebackers coach. The total collapse of Marinelli's Detroit teams forced Snow to return to the college ranks, where he coordinated the Eastern Michigan defense until Rhule hired him as Temple's defensive coordinator in 2013. Rhule knew Snow previously from serving as his defensive line coach when Snow coordinated the UCLA defense in 2001. Like Rhule, Snow has shown a willingness to utilize various schemes depending on the personnel he has to work with. Working with a 3-4 base in Baylor last year, Snow's defense held opponents to 19.8 points per game, a borderline miraculous accomplishment given how traditionally bad the Baylor defenses are. In their final year at Temple, Snow and Rhule held opponents to 18.4 points per game. Snow and Rhule appear a promising tandem for the Carolina defense.

Matt Nagy, HC, CHI

That all fell apart rather quickly. After winning the NFC North in his debut season with Chicago, winning Coach of the Year honors in the process, it seemed safe to declare Nagy one of the league's top coaches generally, and certainly among the best recent head coaching hires. Things went slightly differently in 2019, though, and the dysfunction reached such heights at times that it felt like Nagy's job security warranted serious questioning. But that would have been a rash response given how successful he was in Year 1, and it's fair to wonder whether anyone can win with a quarterback as dysfunctional as Mitch Trubisky was in 2019, especially in the season's first half. Trubisky wasn't good in 2018, but in 2019 he declined to the point that his worst showings produced some of the most horrifying NFL footage of all time. Trubisky will likely never be good, so Nagy and the Bears are in the tough spot of knowing they need to find a replacement while pretending they're still committed to the one getting replaced. On the one hand, Nagy showed the ability to win despite Trubisky in 2018, but on the other hand there's probably nothing to be done if 2018 Trubisky was an impostor. When things are working well Nagy would prefer to use a motion-heavy, uptempo offense that errs toward aggression, but Trubisky's struggles have forced Nagy to play it more conservative, especially in the tempo sense.

Mark Helfrich, OC, CHI

A former Oregon head coach and student of Chip Kelly before that, Helfrich's exact influence over the Bears appears modest at most. Nagy still has his hands on the offense, so Helfrich's role might be as more of a caretaker and gameplanning helper. He was mostly a failure as a head coach at Oregon, so there's reason to limit his responsibilities.

Chuck Pagano, DC, CHI

Vic Fangio is an elite defensive coordinator and set a high bar for Pagano in Chicago, but Pagano did quite well in his first season as Fangio's replacement, especially given the broader dysfunction with the Bears in 2019. They allowed 18.6 points per game, good for fourth-best in the league, and generated Pro Football Reference's fourth-highest hurry rate (12.9) despite blitzing at the eighth-lowest frequency (23.5 percent). Running a lot of Cover-3 type looks that are so popular these days, the Bears do it a little differently than most others by doing it from a 3-4 rather than a 4-3. As long as Akiem Hicks, Khalil Mack, Roquan Smith, and Eddie Jackson are on the field, the Bears should continue showing well on defense under Pagano.

Zac Taylor, HC, CIN

It's difficult to determine fair first-year expectations for pretty much any coach on any team, but it's especially difficult in Taylor's case. Not only was it his first year as the Bengals' head coach, it was only his third year of coaching at any level in the NFL, his previous positions the rather anonymous tasks of quarterbacks coach (2018) and assistant wide receivers coach (2017) under Sean McVay. In other words, Taylor was barely qualified to serve as head coach of the University of Cincinnati, let alone the Bengals. Ostensibly hired to be the next McVay, Taylor's recent history as quarterback coach and his more distant history of playing quarterback for Nebraska didn't result in any promising outcomes for Cincinnati's quarterback play, or offensive production generally. Between Andy Dalton and an ill-conceived starting stint for rookie Ryan Finley, the Bengals threw for just 3,994 yards (57.8 percent completion rate, 6.5 YPA), 18 touchdowns, and 16 interceptions. To be fair to Taylor, he showed some drive for innovation by running at a high tempo (sixth-fastest according to Football Outsiders), and at his young age there's plenty of time for him to improve as a coach. The question is whether he'll improve fast enough to be more than a regretted two-year experiment by a barely-solvent franchise. With the first overall pick and Joe Burrow likely incoming, the expectations will be higher in Year 2.

Brian Callahan, OC, CIN

The son of Bill Callahan, Brian was more of a caretaker underneath Taylor rather than a consistently important decision maker. Perhaps it might change in 2020, but last year at least it was Taylor who called the plays for the Bengals.

Lou Anarumo, DC, CIN

Anarumo couldn't get much done with the 2019 Bengals defense, allowing the eighth-most points per game (26.3) while struggling against both the run and the pass, conceding a league-worst 2,382 yards (4.7 YPC) on the ground and a league-worst 8.3 yards per attempt by the air. Dubious as Cincinnati's defensive personnel might be, the Bengals also have some legitimately good players, especially on the four-man defensive line. Anarumo needs to show drastic improvement in 2020, even if he remains at a talent disadvantage.

Kevin Stefanski, HC, CLE

Stefanski takes the head coaching job in Cleveland after Freddie Kitchens' miserable one-off showing. It's Stefanski's first shot at head coaching, but he's been on the head coaching radar for a couple years now, and he otherwise demonstrated some stability by serving 14 straight seasons for Minnesota in some capacity or another under three different head coaching regimes. Beginning with assistant to head coach in 2006, Stefanski would go on to contribute as the assistant quarterbacks coach before serving as tight ends coach, running backs coach, quarterbacks coach, and offensive coordinator. Be it due to the influence of Gary Kubiak with Minnesota in 2019 or Stefanski's own inherent inclination as an offensive coach, Stefanski is expected to primarily use a zone-blocking approach on offense and the hope is that a Kubiak/Shanahan-type rushing offense might spring forth as a result. With a player like Nick Chubb serving as the running back in this arrangement, it's easy to get high hopes. While the passing game might be more quick-release than downfield-oriented, the theory is that the running game success and subsequent playaction passes should propel big plays through the air. The Browns will of course need to field a vaguely competent offensive line for any of this to work, and they fell miles short of that in 2019.

Joe Woods, DC, CLE

Woods is one of the league's most respected defensive backs coaches, standing out with the 49ers last year and the Vance Joseph Broncos before that. With the 49ers he coaxed big years out of former fringe prospects K'Waun Williams and Emmanuel Moseley, while Richard Sherman played more like he was 22 than the nearly 32 years old he actually was. Of course, it's easy to look good at corner when you have the league's most intimidating pass rush. The good news for Woods is that he has some notable talent to work with in Cleveland. Myles Garrett will be an immediate All-Pro presence when he while additional standout prospects like Larry Ogunjobi, Denzel Ward, and Greedy Williams provide further hope.

Mike McCarthy, HC, DAL

McCarthy arrives to Dallas after a year off from the NFL, and during that hiatus he claims to have subjected himself to a crash course in analytics. It's difficult to tell what he meant by that, let alone whether he was being sincere with the comment. McCarthy showed some stubbornness as head coach of the Packers, so it might be charitable to believe the conversion story. But again, it's difficult to tell what McCarthy is referring to even if he's earnest. Is he referring to simple in-game decision making like down and distance scenarios? When to punt, when to kick a field goal, when to go for it? Pass/run splits? Play design? It wasn't really defined. All we know is Jerry Jones chose McCarthy over Marvin Lewis, and there's not much inspiring about that. McCarthy was in any case once a coveted quarterbacks coach whose playcalling and scheme had run stale as head coach in Green Bay. If McCarthy has grown as a coach, he'll continue to avail himself to information instead of spitefully doing the opposite of what's reasonably suggested to him. If he's grown as a schemer and playcaller, he'll look to get more lopsided formations, more pre-snap motion, more playaction – part of the problem with his Green Bay playcalling is that the route combinations rarely crossed or otherwise flooded single zones in the defense, making it easier for defensive backs to sit on routes while keeping their eyes on the quarterback. In Green Bay all he did was tell the offense to win its one-on-one matchups, which isn't actually a plan at all. If Dallas can retain both Dak Prescott and Amari Cooper, then McCarthy will have no excuse for failure in Dallas.

Kellen Moore, OC, DAL

Moore was quite promising at points in his first season as Dallas' offensive coordinator, a rapid ascent for the 31-year-old former NFL quarterback. Dallas' offense featured more shiny pre-snap tricks and more downfield aggression generally than past years, yet at times it appeared that Jason Garrett might have intervened to pull back the reins on Moore, directing him to keep the ball on the ground and play it safer than Moore otherwise had a mind for. It remains to be seen how much authority McCarthy will grant Moore, but if McCarthy doesn't let him truly run this offense then Dallas might have to watch another team sign away Moore after this season. Considering how promising he was in 2019, this would be a potentially costly error on Dallas' part, reminiscent of when they let Sean Payton get away to New Orleans.

Mike Nolan, DC, DAL

The former 49ers head coach who innovated the Suit Guy gimmick, Nolan's head coaching job burned out in 2008 before he took on three uninspiring stints as defensive coordinator with the Broncos (2009), Dolphins (2010-2011), and Falcons (2012-2014) before serving as linebackers coach in San Diego (2015) and New Orleans (2017-2019). Originally brought up in the Ravens' defensive dynasty, it's probably safe to say by now that he was a product of the systems in which he initially was known. Still, New Orleans' linebacker play was memorably good in recent years, and it's possible that Nolan has his groove back after a somewhat humiliating prior decade. Formerly a 3-4 coach, it seems like he'll maintain the 4-3 defense Dallas has utilized in recent years. For what it's worth, the Saints blitzed quite a bit while Nolan was there, including ninth-most in 2019 according to PFR.

Vic Fangio, HC, DEN

Fangio's Denver debut was off to a wretched start through the first month, the team's 0-4 record especially disheartening because of the team's weak showing on defense, the one area they were supposed to be good in Fangio's inaugural season as head coach. Fangio oversaw may of the NFL's best defenses going back three decades, yet in Week 1 the Broncos fans had to sit through the intense nausea of Derek Carr going 22-of-26 with all day to throw. Fangio's scheme slowly gained traction from that point, though, and despite a wretched offense the Broncos managed to go 7-5 after September. Star edge rusher Bradley Chubb (ACL) and slot corner Bryce Callahan (foot) both missed the entire season, moreover, so Fangio was able to stabilize the ship even without two of his top projected contributors. Von Miller will already be 31 in March, though, and the Broncos were already in need of fresh talent at all three levels of the defense, especially inside linebacker and cornerback, so Fangio will once again need to thread the needle in 2020.

Pat Shurmur, OC, DEN

Rich Scangarello couldn't have done much better in his one season as Fangio's offensive coordinator, as the Broncos had a truly awful collection of talent aside from Courtland Sutton, Phillip Lindsay, and perhaps Noah Fant. Still, Fangio leaped at the chance to replace Scangarello with Shurmur following Shurmur's firing from his head coaching position with the Giants. Shurmur's Giants offense moved at a top-10 pace while creating both pass and run opportunities for quarterback Daniel Jones. Drew Lock is a standout athlete as well, so Shurmur might look to get him moving around to limit the pressure on his passing production, especially until the Broncos put forth a vaguely competent offensive line.

Ed Donatell, DC, DEN

Donatell has coached Fangio's defensive backs the last five years, and he's more of a caretaker than a true defensive coordinator. Fangio is more or less in charge of the 3-4 Denver defense, which created roughly league-average pressure despite a below average blitz rate in 2019.

Matt Patricia, HC, DET

It's been a turbulent first two seasons for Patricia, and he presumably has a short leash heading into 2020. Ostensibly hired for his work as New England's defensive coordinator following the 2017 season, Patricia's Detroit teams have specifically featured memorably bad defenses, including last year. Despite adding two coveted free agents in defensive lineman Trey Flowers and cornerback Justin Coleman, the Lions were remarkably soft against the pass. They conceded 33 passing touchdowns compared to just seven interceptions, and on the ground they were no better than average. Patricia had the personnel of his choosing, so there's no excuse for that sort of failure. A defining trait of Patricia's Detroit defenses has been the inability to produce pressure, and with all day to throw opposing quarterbacks have been able to pick on Coleman and Darius Slay despite their considerable talent and salary cap hits. PFR credits the 2019 Lions with a pressure rate of 18.8 percent, ranking fourth-worst in the league. Patricia especially invites that outcome due to his unwillingness to blitz -- the Lions blitzed at the third-lowest rate last year.

Darrell Bevell, OC, DET

Last year was Bevell's first with Detroit, but he was a well-known commodity all the same after serving as the offensive coordinator for Pete Carroll from 2011 to 2017. Bevell was largely written off as run-obsessed due to that work in Seattle, but his offense looked more modern in Detroit. Given how run-heavy the Seahawks remain under Brian Schottenheimer, it's fair to figure that Bevell's Seattle offense was more reflective of Carroll than Bevell. Even with Matthew Stafford's injury and a stint from a run-heavy quarterback in Jeff Driskel, the Lions ended up throwing the ball 571 times, which slightly outpaced the league average of 558. Perhaps Bevell wished to run the ball more and had his hand forced by Detroit's weak defense, but the fact stands that Kenny Golladay and Marvin Jones combined for 20 touchdowns even as Detroit finished the year with its third-string quarterback.

Cory Undlin, DC, DET

Primarily a defensive backs coach, Undlin arrives to Detroit after coaching the Eagles secondary since 2015. The results were horrendous, but who knows how the culpability distributes. Either way, Patricia will presumably handle most of the defensive coordinating.

Matt LaFleur, HC, GB

LaFleur's first season with Green Bay went well for the most part, the Packers finishing 13-3 with a division title while advancing past the wildcard round of the playoffs. It was an uneven showing, though, as consistency eluded the Packers offense and defense both despite some strong showings in isolated instances. LaFleur was hired to be the next Sean McVay, and he clearly isn't that. He might be a good coach yet, and he's shown some promising traits, but he just isn't a natural offensive schemer like McVay is. Still, LaFleur seems to be a curious person and he at least avails himself to suggestions for improvement. He shows a generally pragmatic intent, displaying a willingness to drastically alter his game plans from one week to the next rather than clinging to one particular schematic focus – a notable flaw with prior head coach Mike McCarthy. LaFleur was in any case lucky to finish 13-3, and he'll need to improve Green Bay's peripheral stats if he wants to avoid painful regression in 2020. Despite the team's overall success, Aaron Rodgers' passing efficiency stats were troubling – 62.0 percent completed at 7.0 yards per attempt is horrendous – and the team can't expect Aaron Jones to run for 16 touchdowns again.

Nathaniel Hackett, OC, GB

Hackett was quietly one of the league's more promising offensive coordinators up until he was fired for Jacksonville's poor 2018 offense, but in Green Bay he mostly defers to LaFleur.

Mike Pettine, DC, GB

Pettine announced a novel if not questionable philosophical approach to his 2019 Green Bay defense, more or less conceding the run in exchange for spending more resources to scheme against the pass. It makes enough sense in theory – the ability and willingness to pass correlates to points better than an offense's ability to run the ball – but it's fair to debate whether the gains against the pass justified the concessions on the ground. The Packers' pass defense graded sixth-best by PFR's points-added metric, yet the run defense placed second-worst. That run defense was a problem against the 49ers in particular, giving up 220 yards and four touchdowns to Raheem Mostert. Pettine in any case chose not to blitz much in 2019, the Green Bay blitz rate ranking fifth-lowest league-wide, which put a lot of pressure on the secondary as the Packers' pressure rate ranked 12-worst.

Bill O'Brien, HC/OC, HOU

Perhaps O'Brien was always bad, but he sure seemed to explore new lows in 2019, taking a chainsaw to the overall solvency of the team as interim GM while his scheme as offensive coordinator dragged down a superbly talented passing game. Similarly to Mike McCarthy in Green Bay, O'Brien's playbook is too predictable and inflexible, leaving his players at a schematic disadvantage against defenses that know what to expect. With his offense reduced to a Beat The Guy In Front Of You scheme, the Texans often went long stretches without moving the ball, even with Deshaun Watson, DeAndre Hopkins, Will Fuller, and Kenny Stills comprising a uniquely talented passing offense. No one can cover those receivers in man coverage, but O'Brien's route combinations play right into the hands of any basic zone defense. The routes are too balanced and symmetrical, so when a defense drops into zone each defender is left with a simple, stress-free task. What O'Brien should have done in these cases was call imbalanced, asymmetrical routes to flood those zones and force the defenders to make tough decisions. Perhaps O'Brien will adjust on this front, but he was clueless in 2019. He additionally showed a disturbing insistence on running the ball on first and second downs, leaving Watson burdened not only with predictable playcalls, but difficult distances in known passing situations.

Anthony Weaver, DC, HOU

Weaver replaces Romeo Crennel as Houston's defensive coordinator, an in-house promotion from defensive line coach. The Texans hired Weaver as their defensive line coach in 2016, making the upcoming season Weaver's fifth under O'Brien. Considering he worked under Crennel, Weaver's promotion is unlikely to rock the boat much as far as Houston's scheme. They'll remain a 3-4, the scheme Weaver played in as an NFL defensive end. The Texans blitzed the eighth-most last year only to generate the second-lowest pressure rate according to PFR, so Weaver has his work cut out for him.

Frank Reich, HC, IND

You generally can't criticize a coach if his starting quarterback gets hurt and misses the whole year, especially given how good Reich was in his debut season with the Colts in 2018. Andrew Luck's surprise retirement made the floor fall out from the Colts, who just couldn't find a way to overcome Jacoby Brissett's profound limitations as a passer. A year after advancing to the divisional round of the AFC playoffs, the Colts finished 2019 season with a 7-9 record. After calling the league's most uptempo offense in 2018, Reich slowed the Colts offense to a middling pace in order to hide Brissett in 2019, and with the lower play volume Brissett only compounded matters by showing horrific per-play efficiency. It took smoke and mirrors just to get Brissett to complete 60.9 percent of his passes at 6.6 yards per pass, though to be fair it didn't help that T.Y. Hilton, Devin Funchess, Parris Campbell, and Marlon Mack all dealt with extensive injury issues. Whatever the status of Indianapolis' talent on offense, Reich showed in both seasons the ability to lift the team above its baseline. As much as Luck isn't replaceable, the Colts should become threatening again if they can improve at quarterback.

Nick Sirianni, OC, IND

Brought up by Frank Reich starting with the Chargers (2013, offensive quality control), Sirianni coached quarterbacks for two years after that before switching to wide receivers coach for the 2016 and 2017 seasons. We might be talking about Sirianni as a head coaching prospect by now if Andrew Luck hadn't retired, but after a year of struggles with Jacoby Brissett it leaves Sirianni with a major challenge going into 2020.

Matt Eberflus, DC, IND

Eferlus' defense produced at a precisely average level in 2019, finishing 16th in PFR's expected points contributed metric, which was arguably a disappointment after Eberflus led the 2018 Colts defense to a ninth-placed ranking. In both seasons Eberflus relied more than most on zone coverages while blitzing rarely, and in both seasons the Colts displayed rather tame pass rushes. It's not clear whether Eberflus considers it a priority to create more pressure – the low blitz rate doesn't quite imply urgency – but it would be nice to see him secure more disruptiveness in the pass rush.

Doug Marrone, HC, JAC

Marrone was ostensibly hired for his background as an offensive coordinator, initially built up with the Saints from 2006 to 2008 before working as Syracuse's head coach from 2009 to 2012. His two seasons as the Bills' head coach were turbulent at best, however, and with that he was reduced to Jacksonville's offensive line coach until 2016, when he was named interim head coach following the firing of Gus Bradley. For whatever reason, the Jaguars just won't fire Marrone since then. Even with the Jaguars throwing two offensive coordinators under the bus two years in a row (Nathaniel Hackett and John DeFelippo), Marrone is for some reason off the hook for Jacksonville's annually poor offenses. Given that the Jaguars signed Jay Gruden to be their next offensive coordinator, it in any case seems like Marrone might mostly keep his hands off the 2020 Jacksonville offense.

Jay Gruden, OC, JAC

Perhaps Gruden angered a powerful and vengeful deity, because his working situations have been consistently awful in the NFL. His reward for coaxing multiple 30-touchdown seasons from Andy Dalton was a 'promotion' to Washington's head coaching position, where lunatic owner Daniel Snyder's presence draws an unstoppable curse, and now he gets to rebuild the offense for a franchise that seemingly intends to leave the continent. To be fairly critical of Gruden, the Washington offense reached a truly low point at the end of his watch, and he doesn't do great on the question of what he's done lately. Still, he had some competitive seasons on a Washington team that was run like a circus even on its best days, so it wouldn't be shocking if he could prove useful for the Jaguars, especially relative to their low starting point. But even if Gruden is relatively successful in Jacksonville, the overall look of the offense shouldn't be terribly different. The offense will likely be more underneath-oriented than downfield, though we can probably expect Gruden to call more playaction after the Jaguars did so on just 13.8 percent of their pass attempts last year.

Todd Wash, DC, JAC

After a fast start to his career as Jacksonville's defensive coordinator, leading the defense to dominant showings in 2016 and 2017, things have taken a turn for a worse for Wash since 2018 and especially 2019. Originally a defensive line coach in the Pete Carroll coaching tree, Wash's methods ceased to work after the Jaguars lost contributors like Telvin Smith and Jalen Ramsey. Wash will get another shot in 2020, but the talent question remains and the Marrone coaching regime in general is on thin ice.

Andy Reid, HC, KC

Andy finally got his Super Bowl victory, and with that he extinguishes the most pressing criticism against his otherwise impressive career history. Reid will probably always lack something in terms of in-game decision making, but his combination of schematic insight and quarterback coaching ability have made him a consistently successful NFL head coach over the last 20 years. He now heads into the 2020 season with a 207-128-1 regular season record. Reid's offense with Patrick Mahomes is predictably defined by its combination of spread-out, downfield passing while exhibiting one of the league's leading tempos (sixth-fastest in neutral situations according to Football Outsiders).

Eric Bieniemy, OC, KC

Bieniemy didn't get hired as a head coach following the 2019 season, but he might be the favorite among NFL coordinators and assistant coaches to get hired in the next round. By then he'll have coordinated the Chiefs offense for three years, each of them likely wildly successful. It's of course reasonable to be skeptical of the extent to which Bieniemy truly designed and orchestrates the Chiefs offense when Reid is obviously the one ultimately responsible for it, and Matt Nagy's 2019 tanking probably didn't help that anxiety. Still, the former NFL running back has a lot of advocates and the campaign to hire him will only gain steam from here.

Steve Spagnuolo, DC, KC

Last year was Spanguolo's first as defensive coordinator in Kansas City, but the former failed Rams head coach (2009-2011) has five years of coordinator experience aside from that, including a fairly memorable run with the Giants in 2007 and 2008. Spagnuolo was originally brought up with Reid in Philadelphia (1999-2006), where he coached defensive backs and linebackers after a two-year stint as a general defensive assistant. Raised in the same Jim Johnson scheme that tutored Ron Rivera and Sean McDermott around the same time, Spagnuolo's scheme is also 4-3 based with ambitiously disguised coverages. The results in Year 1 were mixed – no one is going to complain after a Super Bowl-winning campaign – but there were a couple disappointing outcomes in Spagnuolo's Kansas City debut. They raised their blitz rate from 20.7 to 29.1, yet the pressure rate fell from 27.4 to 22.2, and the defense was arguably the league's worst against the run. To Spagnuolo's credit, the Chiefs pass defense overall ranked eighth-best in Pro Football Reference's points-contributed metric. Perhaps Spagnuolo's scheme will catch on more fully in his second season with the Chiefs – healthy seasons from Chris Jones, Juan Thornhill, and Kendall Fuller would certainly help on that front.

Anthony Lynn, HC, LAC

It wasn't long ago that Lynn was regarded as one of the league's better head coaches, his renowned military-type philosophy lauded for its contributions toward a Chargers culture of blue-collar solemnity. That narrative fell apart in 2019, not only because the Chargers were a hideous mess on the field, but also because there seemed to be weird disciplinary issues with the team late in the season. Most notably, All Pro slot corner Desmond King was deactivated as a healthy scratch for a Week 15 game against Minnesota, the reasoning for which was never disclosed. Generally speaking, it's a bad thing for team morale if the Authority Minded head coach is conducting undisclosed disciplinary measures against the best players on a driftless team. Perhaps Lynn turns the ship around, but the Chargers face major personnel questions particularly with the impending exit of Philip Rivers, and it doesn't help the team's solvency is less than convincing.

Shane Steichen, OC, LAC

Steichen was the next man up after the Chargers fired incumbent offensive coordinator Ken Whisenhunt following Week 8, but Steichen's ascent did nothing to fix the trajectory of the Chargers, who would go 2-6 after a 3-5 start to the season. It was never likely that the run-minded Lynn would allow Steichen to air it out, but the worsened range of Philip Rivers limited the options further. It's therefore difficult to know how much Steichen might be held responsible, but it's nonetheless true that Rivers threw 11 touchdowns compared to 13 interceptions in the eight games under Steichen. It's also discouraging that the Chargers ranked 32nd in Football Outsiders' situation-neutral tempo metric. The exact look of the 2020 Chargers offense might depend on what happens at quarterback and with Melvin Gordon at running back, but it's safe to say that up until now Steichen and Lynn have preferred a downtempo, run-heavy offense.

Gus Bradley, DC, LAC

Formerly the failed head coach of the Jaguars (2013-2016), Bradley is pretty much coasting by as a decent-but-not-great defensive coordinator while implementing the schematic principles of Pete Carroll in Seattle, where he was a more successful defensive coordinator from 2009 to 2012. One of the few distinctions in Bradley's scheme from the average Carroll-like Cover-3 defense is that Bradley will utilize Casey Hayward as a shadow corner, but other than that it's like most of your modern press-heavy Cover-3 4-3 defenses.

Sean McVay, HC, LAR

It all seemed so easy for McVay until last year, when the dream-like Rams offense woke up to a much colder, more frightening world and struggled to find answers in the new terrain. The exact cause of this regression is up to debate, and it's possibly the result of several concurrent factors. Perhaps the McVay scheme itself, with its three-wide revolution and wide-zone run game, was decoded somewhat, resulting in a stumble from quarterback Jared Goff. Perhaps McVay successfully schemed over Goff's flaws for two years, only for the magic to dry up and leave this truer, worse form of Goff for defenses to victimize. Perhaps neither McVay nor Goff truly fell off in 2019, and maybe instead the blame should go to an offensive line that regressed without standout guard Rodger Saffold, who went to Tennessee just in time for 37-year-old left tackle Andrew Whitworth to decline noticeably. Not only did Goff run into a wall in 2019 (64.9 percent comp → 62.9, 8.4 YPA → 7.4, 101.1 QB Rating → 86.5), but running back Todd Gurley also struggled to display his pre-2019 form. The runner's yardage from scrimmage dropped by 767 despite playing one more game than in 2018, his yards per carry (4.9 → 3.8) and yards per target (7.2 → 4.2) badly suffering on the efficiency front. Unfortunately for McVay, the Rams are tight against the cap and have few draft picks to improve the personnel for the foreseeable future, so it's not consolation to McVay if the blame of his declining results can be placed with Goff, the offensive line, or whatever else.

Brandon Staley, DC, LAR

The Rams created top-grade pass rushes under Wade Phillips and occasionally did well against the pass generally, but they were consistently below average against the run and sometimes had breakdowns in coverage anyway. Following 2019's disappointing conclusion, McVay and the Rams decided to look elsewhere at defensive coordinator. Staley is a fresh coaching prospect just three years removed from the FCS ranks, where he was defensive coordinator at James Madison for three years. He was picked from the college level by Vic Fangio, who had him coach linebackers for the Bears in 2017 and 2018 before bringing Staley to Denver in the same role last year. Fangio's style of defense is vaguely similar to the Phillips scheme in that they're both 3-4 and generally successful, though Fangio's defenses seem to emphasize less blitzing and more focus on the run defense than Phillips' tend to. For that reason, we might expect the Rams' pressure rate to drop, but we also might expect more two-gap assignments in the front seven to plug more rushing lanes.

Jon Gruden, HC, LV

Gruden's second season with the Raiders went reasonably well, especially given the adjusted expectations of the rebuild following the trades of Khalil Mack and Amari Cooper in 2018. But after a 7-9 season it's not clear what will happen with quarterback Derek Carr, who posted very clean numbers yet fell short again in the competitive sense. Carr predictably was at his worst as the playing situations became more meaningful, and now there's minimal attachment between the Raiders and their quarterback despite Carr completing 70.4 percent of his passes at 7.9 yards per attempt while forging a QB rating of 100.8. Gruden is more of a west coast offense sort of coach than a downfield one, but even by Gruden's standards Carr's 6.7-yard depth of target was a bit low. Indeed, it left the Raiders offense too dependent on yards after the catch, where even an average of 6.2 yards per catch (90th percentile) couldn't take the offense to the next level. Despite all of Carr's 'efficiency,' the Raiders scored only 19.6 points per game (24th), so it obviously didn't amount to much. If the Raiders change to another quarterback then perhaps we might see Gruden's offense experiment more downfield. Another change Gruden might want to explore would be the implementation of more playaction passes. Without implying any excuses for Carr, it's not a great look for Gruden that the Raiders attempted playaction on only 16.8 percent of their pass attempts. Regardless of what happens with the quarterback position, the Raiders offense in 2019 was perhaps primarily defined by its commitment to first-round rookie pick Josh Jacobs in the running game. Even at just 21 and with 251 career carries in college, Jacobs was on a 300-carry pace in the 2019 Raiders offense. If Gruden and the Raiders introduce change at quarterback then we might see them go even more run-heavy in 2020.

Greg Olson, OC, LV

Olson is a trusted assistant to Gruden and has been for years, but there probably isn't much that he's truly in charge of. Olson certainly has experience running offenses on his own, though, serving as offensive coordinator for five different teams over his career.

Paul Guenther, DC, LV

This might be Guenther's last chance to get it right in Oakland, as he heads into his third year as coordinator with minimal progress to show. The run defense graded as average in 2019, to be fair, but it doesn't matter much when your pass defense is among the three worst in the league. The season-ending injury to rookie first-round pick Johnathan Abram probably isn't much to blame for this – Abram is a box enforcer rather than a Juan Thornhill coverage-type safety. The unfortunate reality for Guenther is that he's unlikely to have a personnel advantage in 2020, yet the need for improved results will persist all the same. After allowing the second-most points per drive last year, Guenther might want to consider blitzing more in the hopes of generating more pressure. Oakland's pressure rate (19.9 percent according to PFR) was sixth-worst in the league, which coincided with the league's second-lowest blitz rate (17.5 percent). If you have a bad secondary, you better have a good pass rush.

Brian Flores, HC, MIA

Flores arrived to Miami known for his ability to animate and inspire his players to overachievement as opposed to his schematic prowess, and the early results are perfectly in line with those initial assumptions. The Dolphins had some remarkable low points, but unlike truly destitute teams they also had some genuinely impressive rallies at other points, making it fair to wonder what heights they might be capable of if the broader collection of personnel talent were to improve. The Dolphins perhaps most notably played a crucial role in the cancellation of the Patriots dynasty, winning a road contest against New England in Week 17 that cost the Patriots playoff seeding. Flores left something to be desired with his results on defense – his presumed area of expertise after coaching linebackers with the Patriots – but the talent collection was so remarkably poor that it's difficult to hold him accountable for any of it. Still, Miami had the league's worst pressure rate (16.5 percent) and were comically weak against both the run and the pass, so Flores will need to show some results on that front soon. The most disturbing aspect of Flores' first season in Miami was probably the refusal to play Kenyan Drake over Kalen Ballage. That's the sort of poor judgment that makes you worry despite whatever other promise there might be. Beyond fixing the defense, Flores will need to figure something out at the quarterback position beyond the stopgap offered by Ryan Fitzpatrick. The early returns on Josh Rosen don't seem so promising, so Flores has plenty to worry about going into his second season.

Chan Gailey, OC, MIA

The Dolphins fired incumbent Chad O'Shea despite a reasonably decent showing in his one year of offensive coordinator, and Gailey is the replacement. This is a weird hire at a glance, but it's probably reasonable after a closer inspection. The Dolphins fired Gailey was one of the NFL's better offensive coordinators in the early 2000s, but he had been out of the NFL since a two-year stint with the Jets that ended in 2016. Initially brought up in the NFL as Bill Cowher's wide receivers coach (1994-1995) and offensive coordinator (1996-1997), Gailey's main selling point for the Dolphins was probably his past familiarity with Ryan Fitzpatrick, whom he coached with the Jets and Bills. Fitzpatrick's numbers with Gailey look mostly the same as they did last year – the vague tune of 550 pass attempts at 7.0 yards per attempt with a completion percentage in the low 60s, a touchdown count in the low 20s, with about 200 rushing yards to show. Particularly if the offensive line can improve and Preston Williams (ACL) can come back at full strength, Fitzpatrick should mostly maintain the quality of production he showed last year.

Josh Boyer, DC, MIA

Incumbent defensive coordinator Patrick Graham left the Dolphins to join Joe Judge's staff with the Giants, where he secured the title of Assistant Head Coach in addition to defensive coordinator. Boyer was an in-house promotion from then, his 2019 spent coaching the cornerbacks with Miami. Boyer knows Flores well going back a long way, though, as he coached the Patriots defensive backs (2009-2011) before coaching the cornerbacks more specifically (2012-2018). Like you would expect of former Patriots coaches, Flores and Graham showed plenty of amoebic concepts in their first year running the Miami defense, including or especially in the secondary, where players would often line up in positions that didn't feat neatly into conventional defensive alignment categories. You'll notice, for instance, corners lining up in spots that seem like linebacker positions at times. This is all done to disguise the assignments of the defenders, hoping to bait the quarterback into guessing wrong in his pre-snap reads. Boyer is plenty familiar with all of these practices, so they should continue despite Graham's exit. The question of results is a grimmer subject for Boyer and the Dolphins, but at least it can't really get worse than it did last year, when they allowed a league-worst 2.53 points per defensive drive. The Patriots, for some perspective, allowed a league-best 1.0 points per drive.

Mike Zimmer, HC, MIN

Zimmer is one of the league's most respected defensive coaches, and as a head coach he goes into his seventh season with a 57-38-1 record. Of course, what torments him in Minnesota is the inability of the Vikings offense to get over the hump and match the ever-escalating expectations of Zimmer as a head coach. Even in what was a down year for the Minnesota defense (and especially the Minnesota corners), the 2019 Vikings pass defense ranked seventh-best in PFR's points-contributed metric. Against Sean Payton and the Saints in particular Zimmer seems have unique insight, calling zone coverage combinations that confused Drew Brees in Minnesota's somewhat shocking upset playoff victory in 2019. Zimmer may have limitations as a coach but is generally smart enough to account for them, showing some humility in delegating the entirety of the Minnesota offense to offensive coordinator Gary Kubiak. Kubiak has worked magic in the past, so if Zimmer can put forth another strong defense then it's hard to count the Vikings out from Super Bowl hype. It will be interesting to see if Zimmer explores more blitzing in an attempt to boost his returns at cornerback – the Vikings haven't blitzed more than an average rate the last two years, arguably resulting in less pressure than you'd expect of a defensive line anchored by Danielle Hunter, Everson Griffen, and Linval Joseph. One constant with the Zimmer defenses, at least since the arrival of linebacker Eric Kendricks, is that running backs and tight ends just do not get much done. If your receivers don't step up, you generally don't have much going against Zimmer's defenses.

Gary Kubiak, OC, MIN

Kubiak was sort of a coordinator from the shadows for Minnesota last year, providing a guiding presence for true coordinator Kevin Stefanski as the Vikings looked to install the principles of Kubiak's Mike Shanahan-influenced zone-blocking west coast offense. Shanahan may have passed it down, but Kubiak convincingly mastered the offense as well, and the results were seemingly immediate in Minnesota last year, too. Although Dalvin Cook was always an obvious star, he seemed to have a bit more spark yet, and even Alexander Mattison looked far more explosive than he ever did at Boise State. Given Shanahan's extensive history of springing dominant rushing attacks with much lesser talents, those results were somewhat predictable. With Stefanski off to Cleveland as head coach, Kubiak officially takes over the Minnesota offense in what will be his biggest coaching role since he stepped away from the head coaching job in Denver back in 2016. He had his hands on the 2019 offense to some extent, so the Vikings shouldn't drastically change in 2020, but Kubiak's ascent in Minnesota should probably be read as a good thing for the Vikings.

Adam Zimmer and Andre Patterson, DC, MIN

George Edwards left the defensive coordinator position following the 2019 season, and in his absence Mike Zimmer decided to appoint Patterson and his son Adam as the co-defensive coordinators for Minnesota in 2020. It's an interesting development for the two young coaches and has doubtlessly put their careers on the fast track, but this is Mike's defense to manage.

Bill Belichick, HC, NE

Belichick is probably the coaching equivalent of Jerry Rice – he's the best his field has seen and it's almost mathematically inconceivable to imagine anyone catching him -- but the dynasty appears to be over all the same. The Patriots started fast and appeared unstoppable at the beginning of the 2019 season, especially once they added Antonio Brown at receiver, but things fell apart with Brown and the offense seemed to decline over the course of the season from that point. The historically dominant 2019 Patriots defense could only carry the team so long, and the team had no answers for the declining returns on offense, especially after the release of Josh Gordon. Belichick is probably more intimately involved with the Patriots defense than the offense, but he's the rare polymath among NFL coaches, showing a level of competence that justifies a management style that would otherwise be described as 'control freak.' The trade for Mohamed Sanu had Belichick's fingerprints all over it, but unfortunately for Belichick that trade was the first sign that the seemingly infallible coach had no solution for the troubles of the 2019 Patriots offense. Sanu is a good player of course, but the Patriots offense primarily suffered from a lack of speed that allowed the defenses to cover less of the field, leaving Tom Brady with fewer space to throw through. Sanu's arrival only made that worse. Now Brady is a free agent, and the entire identity of the Patriots syndicate is thrown into uncertainty as a result. The defense should remain strong under Belichick's watch, but the dynasty no longer exists if it no longer features Brady at quarterback. Perhaps he'll come out the other side as strong and as in control as ever, but at the very least Belichick is facing his first paradigm shift in 20 years. Perhaps there's reason for optimism – after all, the defining trait of Belichick as a coach is arguably his ability and willingness to make drastic schematic adjustments on short notice. For as much as Belichick's success to this point is inseparable from the success of Brady, no coach has shown mastery over half as many football concepts as Belichick has. Generally speaking, if there's a way to win then Belichick is the best candidate to break the code.

Josh McDaniels, OC, NE

McDaniels once again nearly left the Patriots this offseason, and once again he returned. It's not clear whether he's waiting out Belichick for the head coaching role in New England or if he's just exceedingly selective about his head coaching opportunities elsewhere, but McDaniels is back for 2020. There is a lot to interpret and speculate over this offseason, especially pending the status of Tom Brady in free agency. McDaniels of course worked with Tim Tebow in Denver and has handled varying collections of personnel over the years, but by all accounts it took a special relationship between Brady and McDaniels to make the Patriots offenses we've seen. On some level it's not even obvious whether the offense is truly McDaniels' or if Brady might be thought of as a co-coordinator. Beyond that the week-to-week playcalling and offensive concepts would sometimes vary wildly under McDaniels, a practice that may have traced to Belichick in some way. The main consistency in the recent Patriots offenses has been their tempo, which always ranks near the top of the league. The rest of the details are negotiable from week to week depending on the matchup and the available personnel. Like with Belichick, the only given with McDaniels is a sort of neurotic pragmatism.

Greg Schiano, DC, NE

Schiano took over for Brian Flores last year, and the results were of course spectacular. The Patriots defense preyed at a level not seen since the Legion of Boom, and their improbable turnover creation made the Patriots look unstoppable for much of the year. For as much as Belichick will rightfully get much of the credit for that, Schiano's defensive credentials have always been solid.

Sean Payton, HC, NO

Payton is a coach who has made adjustments over the course of his career, and it will be interesting to see if he tweaks with the Saints' offensive approach after Vikings coach Mike Zimmer seemingly offered the league a Drew Brees-stopping blueprint in the 2019 playoffs. Payton has not only made adjustments in the past, but he's bounced back from some pretty jarring strikes to the jaw. He's come a long way since getting his playcalling taken away by Jim Fassel while serving as offensive coordinator to the 2000 Giants, and various other low points since then were always followed up with bounce-back showings. His window may be closing, though, with Drew Brees at 41 years old and the Saints tight against the salary cap. Brees remains implausibly efficient in the quick-hitting Payton offense, but the downfield threat is absent and the Saints need to find a way to move the ball through the air even when Michael Thomas is covered. The Saints offense rarely asks Brees to throw downfield (7.2 ADOT, 18th percentile), but there's no counter move when the short passing game is cut off. For as much as you might look at Alvin Kamara's diminishing returns as a receiver -- falling from 10.2 yards per catch in 2017 to 8.8 (2018) and 6.6 (2019) – it could just as easily be part of a trend linked to Brees' decline.

Pete Carmichael, OC, NO

Carmichael has served as Payton's offensive coordinator since 2009, though Payton remains the true manager of the Saints offense. Carmichael is probably more accurately thought of as a quarterbacks coach.

Dennis Allen, DC, NO

The former Raiders head coach (2012-2014) saw his Saints pass defense fall apart in 2018, but Allen more or less corrected things in 2019 despite dealing with prohibitively poor slot coverage from cornerback P.J. Williams. Using a 4-3 scheme and blitzing more than most, Allen has made the Saints one of the league's above average pressure defenses despite the hiccups in coverage. It's as a run defense where Allen's work really stands out, though, as the Saints have stopped the run at an elite level each of the last two years.

Joe Judge, HC, NYG

The Giants presumably envisioned Judge as the next John Harbaugh – an accomplished special teams coach from one of the NFL's perennially competitive organizations – the Patriots in Judge's case and the Eagles in Harbaugh's. But in a head coaching class with a number of big-name prospects, Judge was one of the more surprising hires as a mostly anonymous special teams coach. We can't know what Judge intends to do from a schematic standpoint, but the fact that he was approved by GM David Gettleman indicates some substantial amount of commitment to tradition. If Judge tries to bring New England's style of defense with him, then the Giants might show amoebic formations that blur constantly between 4-3, 3-4, and 3-3-5. Judge served as a special teams assistant for Nick Saban for three years before joining the Patriots in the same role in 2012, earning a promotion to special teams coordinator in 2015. He won't turn 39 until December.

Jason Garrett, OC, NYG

Garrett might be the biggest punchline of any NFL coach at any level, but there really is a case to make that he was a fine offensive coordinator hire by the Giants. Finally freed from his borderline abusive working relationship with Jerry Jones, it will be interesting to see how Garrett conducts himself in a role with less pressure and less responsibility. It's easy to forget, but before he was Dallas' head coach Garrett was regarded as one of the league's top quarterback coaches and playcallers – kind of the early prototype for Sean McVay/Kliff Kingsbury hires. Garrett was more aggressive in those days, especially when he was still the offensive coordinator under Wade Phillips. Garrett was a relatively balanced coach even a few years into his head coaching career – it wasn't really until 2014 that Garrett became especially run-obsessed. Who knows whether it was his own decision or one influenced by Jerry Jones, but the Dallas offenses from that point looked curiously similar to the ones Norv Turner ran with Dallas in the early 90s. This all coincided with Dallas investing heavily in its offensive line, again paralleling the early 90s when Dallas' famed offensive line of Mark Tuinei, Nate Newton, Larry Allen, and Erik Williams pulverized defenses as they chased Emmitt Smith all day. Given the public mistreatment Garrett withstood from Jones, it wouldn't be surprising if Garrett were mostly just doing what he was told by Jerry, who tried to push around every Dallas coach not named Bill Parcells. Or perhaps Jones had nothing to do with it and Garrett's trajectory was just the natural result of him getting more conservative with age. At the very least Garrett has convincing credentials as a quarterbacks coach, and he deserves some credit for overseeing the successful development of Tony Romo and Dak Prescott. Given the Giants' investment in Daniel Jones, it's reasonable if they sought Garrett in part to develop the quarterback.

Patrick Graham, DC, NYG

Joe Judge lured Graham to the Giants from Miami, where he thanklessly served as defensive coordinator in 2019. Like Judge and Brian Flores, Graham is originally a product of the Patriots coaching system, and as one it's reasonable to expect him to implement the defensive principles seen in New England. Miami seemed to tinker quite a bit with amoebic formations last year, just as the Patriots are known for, so perhaps Graham will bring those same ambitions to the Giants, who ran a 3-4 scheme under prior defensive coordinator James Bettcher. Graham certainly has his work cut out for him, though, because this Giants defense has no proven pass rushers, and its recent draft picks at cornerback (De'Andre Baker, Sam Beal) have looked shaky at best so far.

Adam Gase, HC, NYJ

There's something begrudgingly admirable about Gase and the fact that he seems to hate and put in no effort with his job, yet the Jets stand by him anyway. It would be an enjoyable antihero comedy routine if it weren't threatening to ruin Sam Darnold in the process. As if the situation was suffering from an excess of stability, Gase's own questionable practices are made even more disruptive by the fact that the Jets front office is terribly mismanaged, and sometimes not even on the same page as Gase. Originally known as an offensive coach, Gase was a wide receivers coach and offensive coordinator under John Fox in Denver (2009-2014) before joining Fox in Chicago to coordinate the offense in 2015. Gase generally resists playing at a high tempo but shows a preference for three-wide sets, including a seemingly healthy dose of trips looks, indicating a general focus on the slot for the passing game. With Robby Anderson an unrestricted free agent and Le'Veon Bell's precise standing with the Jets unclear, it's fair to wonder if the Jets will have the personnel for Gase to run his normal scheme. The Jets showed a disturbing tendency last year to score on the first drive and then play dead from that point, resulting in them averaging the league's lowest points-per-drive figure with just 1.21.

Dowell Loggains, OC, NYJ

Given that Gase is an offensive-minded coach and Loggains is a longtime quarterbacks coach in the NFL, it's probably reasonable to figure that his offensive coordinator role with the Jets is mostly ceremonial. The two know each other going back to their days under John Fox in Chicago.

Gregg Williams, DC, NYJ

Williams is in his second year coordinating the Jets' 3-4 defense, his eighth defensive coordinating job in his NFL career. The results in his Jets debut were mixed. The run defense was smothering, to be fair – no one could run against the Jets – but the pass defense was dysfunctional to the point that you might not notice how well the run defense was doing. Even in a division with weak passing games, the Jets allowed 25 touchdowns to 12 interceptions through the air, and the pressure rate (21.1 percent) ranked below average even though the Jets blitzed at the league's fourth-highest rate according to PFR. Williams turned slot corner Brian Poole into a Pro Bowl-level producer, but Williams will need to have his outside corners better prepared if he wants to coordinate beyond 2020.

Doug Pederson, HC/OC, PHI

Once one of the league's most untouchable coaches, things got a little rough for Pederson during the 2019 season. Injuries among the pass catchers and offensive line certainly didn't help, but Carson Wentz had his worst season since his 2016 rookie year, completing 63.9 percent of his passes at just 6.7 yards per attempt while fumbling 16 times. The only reason the Eagles sneaked into the playoffs was because of how comically inept the Cowboys were – a Week 13 loss to the Dolphins was especially embarrassing for Philly – but ugly or not, the Eagles rallied to finish the season with a 4-0 run, barely securing a 9-7 record. Pederson has shown an adaptable nature as an offensive coach, changing his schemes depending on what he perceives to be the best use of his personnel. Maybe sometimes he guesses wrong, but at least you don't have to worry about Pederson stubbornly tanking a team to illustrate some misguided principle, like Mike McCarthy did in Green Bay. Based on how Philadelphia ended last season – its midseason tailspin halted by a shift two a two-TE offense – we might expect Pederson to bring an initial 2020 loadout where the Eagles use both Zach Ertz and Dallas Goedert on nearly every snap, with running back Miles Sanders a frequent target underneath. What the Eagles do with their targets beyond that might depend on the health of Alshon Jeffery (foot) and DeSean Jackson (abdomen), as well as whether second-year wideout J.J. Arcega-Whiteside progresses at a satisfactory rate. You can also expect the Eagles to use playaction passing at a relatively high clip after doing so on 26.8 percent of their pass attempts in 2019 according to PFR. One interesting twist with the Eagles 2020 offense is the fact that Pederson himself will formally coordinate the offense after firing 2019 coordinator Mike Groh.

Jim Schwartz, DC, PHI

Schwartz's peripheral stats weren't as bad as the narrative recollection might imply – the Eagles' pass defense ranked 14th by PFR's expected points contributed metric – but it sure felt during the season like the Eagles pass defense played at a cripplingly poor level much of the time. That the Eagles benched multiple individuals at corner over the year adds credibility to that recollection. After opening the year with Rasul Douglas, Ronald Darby, and Avonte Maddox at corner, the Eagles would go on to cycle in the likes of Jalen Mills, Sidney Jones, Craig James, and Cre'Von LeBlanc to varying levels of negligible success. The Eagles corners perhaps lacked talent, but it's not the easiest sell given that Darby (second round), Jones (second round), Douglas (third round), and Maddox (fourth round) were all respected prospects, so Schwartz needs to get it together in 2020. Despite his struggles against the pass in 2019, Schwartz reliably puts forth one of the league's best run defenses from year to year, and 2019 was no exception. His 4-3 uses the wide-nine alignment to seemingly strong effect and, at least when you have a Fletcher Cox at defensive tackle, it's made it tough for offensive lines to create room for runners.

Mike Tomlin, HC, PIT

People like Terry Bradshaw gave Tomlin a hard time in recent years, frustrated that he hadn't been able to get the Steelers back to the Super Bowl since 2008, but even a critic like Terry has to give Tomlin credit for twisting an 8-8 record out of the Steelers' cursed 2019 season. Ben Roethlisberger was out for the year about midway into Week 2, and the quarterback options from that point (Mason Rudolph and Devlin Hodges) were beyond awful. Despite using two of the worst quarterbacks any of us will ever see in a regular season game, and despite persistent injuries limiting star runner James Conner and star receiver JuJu Smith-Schuster, Tomlin and the Steelers still managed to avoid a losing season. Tomlin has never had a losing season in his 13 years as Pittsburgh's head coach, by the way. With a suddenly dominant defense at his disposal it's easy to imagine Tomlin getting back into the playoffs in 2020 with a little injury luck. The biggest question is, of course, whether Roethlisberger can make a successful return from his season-ending elbow injury at 38 years old. As much as optimism might be reasonable, it's still asking a lot.

Randy Fichtner, OC, PIT

Fichtner was Roethlisberger's quarterbacks coach beginning in 2010, and he's coordinated the Pittsburgh offense since 2018. He unsurprisingly showed a higher tempo with Roethlisberger at quarterback in 2018 than with Rudolph/Hodges in 2019, but even in the 2019 case Fichtner was somewhat impressive, coaxing encouraging box scores from young wideouts James Washington and Diontae Johnson despite truly abominable play from Mason Rudolph and Devlin Hodges. Going into 2020 it will be interesting to see whether the Steelers throw fewer and shorter passes to ease the recovery of Roethlisberger's elbow. Initially brought up under Bruce Arians in Pittsburgh, Fichtner and Roethlisberger would presumably still like to strike downfield if possible.

Keith Butler, DC, PIT

Butler has coordinated the Pittsburgh defense since 2015, and in the last two years he's taken the Steelers defense to one of its greatest heights of the past 20 years or so. Loaded with pressure players and speed generally, Butler's 3-4 menaced quarterbacks with a ferocious pass rush while limiting opposing running backs to an average of just 3.9 yards per carry. With lots of playmakers at his disposal, expect Butler's blitz-heavy ways to continue in 2020, and likely with considerable success.

Pete Carroll, HC, SEA

It's easy to fixate on the shortcomings of a coach, whether it's an ideological blindspot or a recurring issue of poor situational judgment, without keeping that coach properly accounted for from a broader perspective. In Carroll's case, it's easy – especially if you resent the older style of NFL football – to look at his obsessively run-heavy offenses and decide, 'This thing is bad, and the coach is therefore bad.' In other cases you'd maybe even be correct to follow this standard. But in Carroll's case at least, one undesirable trait doesn't justify a firing. Despite Carroll's resistance to modernity and the complications it brings, his other traits as a coach seem to meaningfully stand out as productive, or else it's difficult to explain how he's gone 21-11 over the last two years despite losing pretty much all of the Legion of Boom. Carroll's lopsided 4-3 Cover-3 defense is one of the most popular schemes in the league at this point, and whatever he lacks in offensive scheming acumen he helps make up for with his sheer ability to get his team prepared to play. To put it another way, you might have the better game plan and a sounder grasp of modern football theory, but it might not matter if he inspires his team to play like they're on some berserker serum. Still, he should seriously consider airing it out more now that he has DK Metcalf running opposite Tyler Lockett.

Brian Schottenheimer, OC, SEA

Schottenheimer defers to the broader vision of Carroll, but it's likely that Schottenheimer would run a similarly run-heavy offense even if left to his own devices. Indeed, Schottenheimer has called run plays on 52.8 and 48.2 percent of Seattle's offensive snaps in 2018 and 2019, respectively, while prior offensive coordinator Darrell Bevell called run plays on only 40.6 percent of the snaps in 2017. Run-obsessive and generally low-tempo, Schottenheimer's playcalling simply isn't ideal for the fantasy prospects of anyone except for maybe Chris Carson.

Ken Norton Jr., DC, SEA

Working underneath Carroll, a defensive-minded coach, Norton is probably more like a worker bee in the Seattle hive than a true leader of the Seahawks defense. He coached linebackers for Carroll from 2010-2014 before spending two years as Oakland's defensive coordinator, returning to Seattle in that role in 2018. Norton and the Seahawks struggled with poor cornerback personnel in 2019, and that issue was compounded by the league's fifth-lowest pressure rate. Unless the Seahawks add at least another good corner opposite Shaquill Griffin and a competent slot corner, the Seattle pass defense might struggle again in 2020.

Kyle Shanahan, HC, SF

Shanahan was once again questioned for his Super Bowl playcalling, but in the 2019 case it was as the head coach of the 49ers rather than the offensive coordinator of the Falcons. Disappointing as it might have been, it has to be read as a sign of promise, especially for a head coach in only his third year. The winning opposing coach in the most recent Super Bowl is the perfect example of Shanahan's ultimate potential -- in fact, Shanahan is on the fast track compared to Reid, who didn't get to the Super Bowl until his sixth season as Philadelphia's head coach. The 49ers still have a competitive window to work with, even with DeForest Buckner due for a record-setting contract and Richard Sherman turning 32, so Shanahan still has bullets and time to aim. With a lot of playaction and outside zone rushing concepts, Shanahan's scheme probably isn't too dissimilar from what division rival Sean McVay runs with the Rams, but Shanahan might have another level yet as far as game-to-game tactics go. More than any other offensive mind in the game, Shanahan is feared for his ability to correctly identify a weakness in any given defense and isolate the player in question, leaving the defensive coordinator unable to hide their vulnerability. Shanahan both spots the initial weakness and plays the long game from there, sequencing his playcalling to lay additional traps in anticipation of the defensive adjustments. The result is that Shanahan puts his playmakers in position to run through the open field, allowing the offense to do major damage from scrimmage even if the quarterback play is middling at best, such as what was the case with Jimmy Garoppolo this year. It will be interesting to see if Shanahan can bring more out of Garoppolo in his second year back from his 2018 ACL tear.

Robert Saleh, DC, SF

Saleh finally came through for the 49ers in 2019, taking the San Francisco defense from one of the league's worst to arguably its best. It's fair to suggest that it had less to do with him and more to do with the talent of the 49ers defense, however. The addition of Nick Bosa in particular may have pushed the 49ers over some threshold, though another year of experience between Richard Sherman and now-standout defensive backs K'Waun Williams, Jaquiski Tartt, and Jimmie Ward probably helped too. Kyle Shanahan picked Saleh from Gus Bradley's coaching staff, meaning Saleh ostensibly runs a similar scheme to Pete Carroll and the Seahawks. A lot of Cover-3, a lot of press coverage at the line. It works when you have the talent, and you saw that last year. For as much as Saleh might be a good coordinator, it's easy to be good when you have San Francisco's devastating front-seven talent.
 

Bruce Arians, HC, TB

There might not be another NFL head coach whose reputation took the hit that Arians did in 2019, as he struggled to utilize Tampa Bay's offensive talent, while by the end of the year the defense was arguably Tampa's greatest asset. The credit for that would go to Todd Bowles rather than Arians, as Arians was supposed to fix the offense and the quarterback in particular. A downfield-oriented playcaller, Arians' approach was supposed to be a good fit with Jameis Winston's chucking tendencies, but the opposite proved to be the case as Winston finished with 33 touchdowns but also 30 interceptions, a figure previously believed to be nearly impossible. More than that, Arians revelead himself for a rigid ideologue rather than a curious pragmatist, particularly in the case of O.J. Howard. Arians can only imagine an offense where the tight end blocks primarily and beyond that mostly serves as a safety valve on short curls and flats routes. Howard is a tight end who is best used downfield, but Arians quite simply never imagined how to use a tight end that way, and for the entirety of 2019 he committed to never learn how. Howard is quite literally bigger and faster than Mike Evans -- if Arians really needed to he could have just had Howard play receiver all year. But Arians looked at the label -- "TE" -- and his ability or willingness to reason from that point shut down completely. Arians in any case seemed to sour on Winston and his turnovers, which is understandable. If the Buccaneers make a change, though, Arians will have questions to answer at all of quarterback, running back, and offensive line. The defense is the strength of the Buccaneers for the time being.
 

Byron Leftwich, OC, TB

Leftwich is Arians' primary apprentice, but it's unclear how much autonomy he holds over the Tampa Bay offense. A downfield hurler as a player, Leftwich's playing style certainly matches well with Arians' philosophy at a glance. Before last year, Leftwich's only offensive coordinator experience as in an interim capacity for the 2018 Cardinals following the firing of incumbent coordinator Mike McCoy.
 

Todd Bowles, DC, TB

Fired after four ill-fated seasons as head coach of the Jets, Bowles was a strong hire for the Buccaneers as defensive coordinator. Bowles is one of the league's most respected defensive coaches generally, but he specifically has a background of expertise with defensive backs. The Buccaneers have a wealth of standout corner prospects in Carlton Davis, Sean Murphy-Bunting, and Jamel Dean, and all three looked increasingly promising as the 2019 season went along. Bowles will need to get creative to generate a pass rush if the Buccaneers lose Shaquil Barrett in free agency, but the run defense is locked shut and the corner personnel looks poised to establish itself as among the league's best. The Buccaneers pass defense was mocked at times last year, but consider those days over. Bowles' 3-4 defense was dependent on the blitz last year, sending extra pass rushers on 43.4 percent of their snaps, but if the corners keep developing then the Buccaneers should be able to blitz with relative impunity.
 

Mike Vrabel, HC/DC, TEN

Vrabel's throwback philosophy worked well for Tennessee in 2019, its combination of dominant running game and generally competent defense allowing the Titans to place timely chokeholds, using cunning and strong execution to create small leads that never dissolved afterward. It's an approach with a razor-thin margin of error – one that begs for regression – but it was arguably the best approach to take with Tennessee's personnel. For as high as Ryan Tannehill's efficiency was as a passer in 2019, a necessary condition for that outcome was the low volume. Still, if you can't throw for more than 369 yards over three playoff games then you probably aren't going to find yourself in any Super Bowls. It's not clear whether it will mean much change for the Titans, but it's probably worth mentioning that Vrabel will likely serve as the defensive coordinator in 2020 with incumbent coordinator Dean Pees retiring.

Arthur Smith, OC, TEN

Smith's first season as offensive coordinator went well for the most part. Despite a poor start to the season under Marcus Mariota, Smith's offense did well enough from that point under Ryan Tannehill. You could even argue that the Titans became one of the league's better offenses under Tannehill, even though the offense remained non-negotiably committed to the run. Smith capitalized on the perceived rushing threat posed by Henry, calling only 448 pass attempts (second-lowest) but 124 of those off playaction (27.7 percent according to PFR). Between the run-heavy playcalling and the offense's sluggish tempo (ranked 22nd by Football Outsiders in seconds per snap), the Smith offense made the clock move quickly, resulting in Tennessee running the third-fewest plays from scrimmage. It remains to be seen what might happen with the Tennessee offense if the game script gives them more point deficits – Tannehill didn't show the ability to carry the offense once the running game was made non-viable by the scoreboard – but Tannehill's efficiency was off the charts in his limited passing volume, completing 70.3 percent of his attempts at 9.6 yards per attempt.

Ron Rivera, HC, WAS

Rivera finally got sent packing from Carolina, but Washington quickly pursued him for their own head coaching spot. Who knows why Dan Snyder locked onto Rivera right away, but one ostensible reason would be for Rivera's reputation as a defensive coach, especially a front-seven coach. If this was Snyder's thinking then it's one of his more reasonable ideas, because Washington does have a considerable amount of front-seven talent that, if galvanized, could change a bad Washington defense into a feared one in a hurry. The 2019 49ers defense might be evidence of this – they were bad until they were great suddenly, and they were great because their massive collection of defensive line talent turned into a smothering, destructive presence that put the rest of the defense in a favorable position. With Jonathan Allen, Daron Payne, Matthew Ioannidis, Ryan Kerrigan, and Montez Sweat to work with, Rivera will have no excuse for a slow start. Rivera was once more of a 4-3 coach under Philadelphia coordinator Jim Johnson and Bears coach Lovie Smith, but he also worked with a 3-4 scheme with the Chargers (2007-2010) and last year with the Panthers. Last year's results in Carolina were mixed – the pass rush was lively, but that they finished with the league-worst run defense means the scheme wasn't truly viable. Last year's uneven results make it fair to worry about whether Rivera knows what he's doing at this point, but at least Washington's 3-4 defensive personnel caters to his ostensible strengths.

Scott Turner, OC, WAS

Son of Norv, Scott goes with Rivera from Carolina to Washington, presumably with the intention of installing similar principles as what the two worked on with the Panthers. There's no Christian McCaffrey in Washington, though, so in a way most of the offensive scheme needs to be built from scratch. Particularly given the unproven quarterback play, we might expect the Washington offense to look less exotic than what Turner and Rivera ran in Carolina, at least initially, but we can still expect Washington to throw much more under Turner than they did under interim coach Bill Callahan.

Jack Del Rio, DC, WAS

Although he's technically the Washington defensive coordinator, Del Rio is probably more like an assistant head coach in the Rivera regime. Rivera is a defensive coach and should maintain primary control over the Washington defense.